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Summary:
A two-stage, two-player non-cooperative game model is developed under an irreversible
capital investment assumption. The main aim is to prediet the number of vessels that each
player in such a game wil find in his best interest to employ in the exploitation of the Arcto-
Norwegian cod stock, given a non-cooperative environment and the fact that all players are
jointly constrained by the population dynamics of the resource. The predictions obtained are
then compared with (i) the sole owner's optimal capacity investments for the two players; (ii)
the results in Sumaila (1994), where perfect malleabilty of c ap aci t y is assumed implicitly; and
(iii) available data on the Arcto-Norwegian cod fishery.
Sammendrag:
Et to-steg to-aktør ikke-kooperativt spil er utviklet under en antagelse om irreversibel kapital
investering. Hovedmålet er å finne antall fiskebåter som hver aktør finner i sin egen interesse
å sette inn for å høste av den norsk arktiske torsken, gitt begrensninger i ressurstilgangen og
at aktørene ikke samarbeider. Resultatene som framkommer er sammenliknet med (1)
resultatet når bare en av aktørene har rettigheten til ressursen, (2) resultatene i Sumaila (1994)
der man har en reversibel kapital antagelse, og (3) tilgjengelig data på de norsk arktiske
torskefiskeriene.
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1.0 Introduction
This paper considers non-cooperative use of a common property fish stock, namely
the Arcto-Norwegian cod. Attention is focused on a restricted access fishery where
only two-agents paricipate in the exploitation of the resource, the aim being to
predict the number of vessels that each agent in such a situation wil find in his best
interest to employ. An important although self-evident aspect of the game is that both
agents are jointly constrained by the population dynamics of the resource. The key
assumption of the paper is that players undertake investment in capital that is
irreversible. This assumption is quite realistie because capital embodied in fishing
vessels is of ten non-malleable: Non-malleabilty is used here to refer to the existence
of constraints upon the disinvestment of capital assets utilzed in the exploitation of
the resource (Clark et aL. 1979). This implies that once a fishing firm or authority
invests in a fleet of vessels it either has to keep it until the fled is depreciated, or else
the vessels can only be disposed off at considerable economic loss.
A number of papers have appeared in the fishery economics literature that focus,
among other things, on the irreversibilty of capital employed in the exploitation of
fishery resources. Examples inc1ude Clark et aL. (1979), Clark & Kirkwood (1979),
Dudley & Waugh (1980), Charles (1983a, 1983b), and Charles & Munro (1985). We
are, however, not aware of any prior work that models, computes numerically and
analyses the exploitation of fishery resources as done in this paper. Among the
examples cited above, only Dudley & Waugh (1980) consider investment decision in
a fishery with more than a single agent paricipating. But even in - this case, only
qualitative statements of the likely effects of this are made. The study of Clark &
Kirkwood (1979) is c10se to the work planned herein, at least in terms of the kind of
questions they address. The authors presented a bioeconomic model that predicts the
number of vessels of each of the two types entering the prawn fishery of the Gulf of
Carentaria under free access. In addition, they estimated the economically optimal
number of vessels of each type. The results they obtained are then compared with
available data on the prawn fishery of the Gulf of Carentaria.
These are issues we also address here albeit with a number of differences. First, there
is a difference with respect to the number of agents in the two studies: While Clark &
Kirkwood (1979) consider the social planner's and open access equilibrium fleet sizes,
we compute equilbrium fleet sizes that wil emerge in a non-cooperative environment
involving two agents, and then, using the se results, we deri ve the social planner's
equilbrium fleet size and discuss the probable open access equilibrium fishing
capacity. Thus, we add a new dimension to the discussion, namely, the two-agent
analysisl. Second, there is a difference in the way we model the population dynamics
of the fish stock: While their study prescribes and uses a single cohort to describe the
fish stock, we accommodate a multicohort population structure.
The primar concern of this study is to develop the necessary framework to
(1) identify a N ash non-cooperative equilibrium solution for a bimatrix game
involving the trawl and coastal fisheries operating on the Arcto-Norwegian cod;
l The motivation for undertaking a two-agent analysis is given in section 2 of this paper.
l
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(2) identify the sole owner equilibrium solutions for the two fisheries, and determine
which among these gives the optimal solution;
(3) compare the results in (1) and (2) above to (i) the results in Sumaila (1994), where
perfect malleability of capital is assumed implicitly, and(ii) with available data on the
Arcto-Norwegian cod. The former comparison would put us in a position to say
something about the possible gains of establishing rental firms for fishing vessels
and/or allowing mobilty of vessels between different stoeks;
(4) discuss the fishing capacities that are likely to emerge in an open access scenario;
and
(5) investigate the effect of fixed cost, interest rates, initial stock size, and the
terminal constraint, on the relative profitabilty of the players.
The next section gives a brief description of the Arcto-Norwegian cod fishery. Section
3 presents the model, a special feature of which is the explicit modeling of the
biologically and economically important age groups of cod. This is followed by a
brief mention of the algorithm for the computation of the equilibrium solutions: The
detailed algorithm is relegated to an appendix. In section 5, the results of the study are
stated. Finally, section 6 conc1udes the paper.
2.0 The Arcto-Norwegian cod fishery
The Arcto-Norwegian cod, gadus morhua, is a member of the Atlantic cod family,
arguably among the world's most important fish species. It inhabits the continental
shelf from shoreline to 600 m depth, or even deeper, usually 150-200 m. It is
gregarious in behaviour, formng shoals or schools and undertakng spawning and
feeding migrations. The diet of adult cod is variable and consists mainly of herring,
capelin, haddock and codling. The Arcto-Norwegian cod spawns only along the
Norwegian coast, mainly in Lofoten in April-March. Typically, it stars spawning at
the age of 7-8 years; eggs are caried by the gulf stream, over the coast where they
hatch, and into the Barents Sea, up towards Svalbard, where the young cod grow. It
has a relatively lon g li fe span: it can live for well over 15 years. A majority of young
cod die. quite early, either because of a lack of adequate food, or because they are
eaten up by other fishes. Young cod between the ages of 3-6 come to the Finnmark's
coast every year. This is because mature capelin, which cod preys on, move to their
spawning spots c10se to the Finnmark's coast. Cod follows and predates them, thus
resulting in good spring cod in the period April to lune.
The Arcto-Norwegian cod is a shared resource jointly managed by Norway and
Russia. Norwegian fishers employ mainly coastal and trawl fishery vessels in the
exploitation of the resource, while their Russian counterparts employ mainly trawlers.
Table 2.1 gives the number of Norwegian trawl and coastal fishery vessels (of 13m
longest length and over) that operated on the "cod fishes group2" for five different
years. In addition to this comes the par of the fishing capacity employed to exploit
2 The cod fishes group include, the Arcto-Norwegian cod, the Arcto-Norwegian haddock, whiting,
Greenland halibut, saith, etc.
2
other species, say, the "herring fishes group" that are used to land the cod fishes as
bycatch.
(Table 2.1 in here!)
Using Norwegian data3, we ca1culated the number of coastal fishery vessels and
trawlers used by Norwegian fishers in the exploitation of the cod fishes group in 1991
to be about 638 and 58, respectively. These landed about 130 and 270 thousand
tonnes of cod, respectively.
To facilitate our analysis three simplifications (about this fishery) are made4. First,
only Norwegian prices and costs are used in the analysis. Second, the vessel types
employed in the exploitation of the resource are grouped into two broad categories,
namely, the coastal and the trawl fisheries, and placed under the management of two
separate and distinct management authorities, henceforth to be known as Coastal
Fisheries Management (C), and Trawl Fisheries Management (T). Third, only the
most cost effective vessels5 in each of these categories are assumed to be employed in
the exploitation of the resource. The assignment of two separate and distinct fleets to
the two management authorities captures, to some extent, the division of the stock
between Norway and Russia, but even in Norway a division is usually made between
the coastal fleet and the trawlers, and the Norwegian quo ta is divided between these.
3.0 The model
The model presented here builds on that discussed in Sumaila (1994), to which the
reader is referred for details. Here, a two-stage, two-player, dynamic, deterrnistic,
non-cooperative game model is put together, the two players being T and C. By a
game we mean a normal (strategic) form, simultaneous-move game in which both
players make their investment decisions in ignorance of the decision of the other. At
stage one of the game, each player invests in fishing capacity ex ante, having in mind
that such investment is irreversible. Then in stage two the players employ their chosen
capacity investment to exploit the shared resource for the next 15 years, subject to the
stock dynamics and nonnegativity constraints.
Both T and C are assumed to be rational and act here to maximize their discounted
profit (payoff) function It : KT x Kc ~ 9t, where KT and Kc are the pure strategy
sets of player i = T, C, that is, the set of fishing capacity (number of vessels or fleet
size) that a player can choose from. Player i's payoff at an outcome (kT,kc) is then
given by It (kT, kc)' A major aim of this modeling exercise is to fin d the strategy
pair (k~, k~) such that no player wil find it in his interest to change strategy given
that his opponent keeps to his. In other words, we are interested in finding Nash non-
cooperative equilibrium in a two-player fishery game, where k~ is a best reply to k~
and vice versa. This is equivalent to stipulating that the inequalities
3 Data in tab les E21 - ESI in Lønnsomhetsundersøkelser (1979 - 1990) were used for the calculations.
4 See Sumaila (1994) for the justifications for these simplifications.
5 eost effectiveness is defined here in terms of least cost per kilogram of fish landed.
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(1)
* * *
IlT(kT,kC) ~ IlT(kT,kC)
* * *IlC(kT,kC:) ~IlC(kT,kC)
hold for all feasible kT and kc.
3.1 On existence of Nash equilibrium
Nash (1950, 1951) proved the existence of equilbrium points under certain
assumptions on each player's strategy space and corresponding payoff function.
Essentially, he dealt with matrix games. Rosen (1965) went further to show that when
every joint strategy lie in a convex, closed, and bounded region in the product space
and each player's payoff function Il i' i = T, C is concave in his own strategy and
continuous in all variables, then there is at least one Nash equilibrium of the game.
This result is stated in theorem 1 below.
THEOREM 1 (Existence of Nash equilbrium, Rosen (1965)): An equiUbrium point
exist for every concave n-person game.
The game we formulate in this paper is a concave 2-person game, and hence satisfies
the above theorem. We can therefore expect at least one Nash equilbrium to exist in
our game.
3.2 On uniqueness of Nash equilibrium
Two steps are taken here to deal with the vexing problem of equilibrium selection.
Step 1: Only open loop strategies are allowed in the second stage of the game6. That
is, each player commts, in advance, his fishing capacity to a fixed time function
rather than a fixed control law (c1osed loop strategies). Note that unlike in the case of
fixed control laws, where the choice of control depends on the past history of the
game, fixed time functions are independent of the actions of the opponent so far in
the game. In information theoretic sense open loop corresponds to the receipt of no
information during play, while c10sed loop represents full information.
The main reason we stick to open loop strategies, even though it is not likely to lead
us to c10sed form solÙtions, is that it would be practically impossible to compute the
predictions of our model if c10sed loop strategies were allowed. This is because
c10sed loop strategies normally entail complex and huge numbers of strategies in
repeated games (see Binmore, 1982). Another reason is that the new "Folk Theorem
for Dynamic Games" introduced by Gaitsgory and Nitzan (1994), gives us reason to
believe that under certain monotonicity assumptions, the set of c10sed loop solutions
that may emerge from our model may coincide with the open loop solutions we
compute herein.
6 In a sense one can argue that the game we formulate herein is not a "pure" open loop strategy game.
This is because although the fishing capacities are chosen once and for all, the capacity utilzation is
chosen in each period depending on the stock size.
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Step 2: The same shadow prices (that is, Lagrange multipliers) are imposed across
both players for resource constraint violation. Flåm (1993) shows that in addition to
this, if the marginal profit correspondence is strzctly monotone, then there exists a
unique Nash equilibrium for our game. Incidentally strict monotonicity of marginal
profit correspondence is also a sufficient condition for convergence in our mode!.
In the presentation of the mathematical equations in the rest of the model, two other
subscripts (a=O,...,A, and s=l,...,S) are used to denote age groups of fish, and time
periods or stages, respectively7. Based on the li fe expectancy of cod, the last age
group A, is set equal to 15. The finite time horizon of the game, S, is set equal to 15
due to computationallimitations.
Catch
Let catch of age group a (in number of fish) by player i in fishing period s, hi,a,s, be
given by
(2) hi,a.s = qi,ana.sEi,s
where the effort profie, Ei,s = kiei,s, and ki is the ex ante fixed c ap aci t y investment
of player i; e¡,s E (0,1), is the capacity utilisation, that is, the fraction of ki taken out
for fishing in a given year; na,s is the post catch number of fish of age a in fishing
period s and qi,a is the player and age-dependent catchabilty coeffcient, that is, the
share of age gro up a cod being caught by one unit of effort.
Total catch by all players of age gro up a in period s can thus be written as
(3)
ha,s = L,qi,a na,skiei,s
i
Total catch in weight by all players over all age groups in periods is given by
(4)
hs = L,ha,swa
a
where Wa is the weight of fish of age group a.
Costs and Prices
The fishery is assumed to face perfectly elastie demand. Thus, the ex-vessel seIlng
price of fish per kilogram, V, is assumed to be constant. The haresting costs per
vessel employed by player i in period s, 'I i,s consist of fixed costs (cp ¡) and variable
costs ('Ô i) which are proportionate to ei,s,
(5)
'Ô¡ i +b
'li,s =CPi +-ei,s
(l+b)
7 Recall that the subscript denoting player is i = T, C.
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where b = 0.01. This formulation of the cost function ensures strict concavity of
individual profit as a function of individual effort. This strictness is important for the
sake of convergence.
Revenue
The revenue to player i, in period s, fi,s, comes from the sale of his catch over all age
groups in that period, that is,
(6)
ri,s = VI w ah~a,s
a
Profits
Player i's profit in a given period s is then given by the equation
(7) 1t ¡,s (nS' e¡,s) = r ¡,s - k¡'V ¡,s
where k = (ki,k_¡). Note that 1t¡,s is a function of the actual fish abundance in aperiod,
ns, and own effort of a player in that period. We restrict our analysis to the case of
perfectly non-ma1leable capital in which the depreciation rate is equal to zero and
capital has a negligible scrap value. Even though this simplification is not quite
realistie, the qualitative effect of this is expected to be insignificant. The profit
function given by equation (7) is formulated to incorporate this restriction.
Objective
Given ki, the second stage problem of player i is to find a sequence of capacity
utilization, ei,s (s=1,2,...,S), to maximise his present value (PV) of profits (payoft),
that is,
(8)
s
TI¡(kT,kc) = ~axLU:1t¡(ns,e¡.s)
i s=l
subject to the stock dynamics (see below) and the obvious nonnegativity constraints,
expressed mathematically as ei,s ~ O, for all i and s; na,s ~ O, for all a and s;
na,S+ 1 ~ O, for all a; and na,O ~ O given. Here, u¡ = (1 + ri t is the discount factor; ri
:; O denotes the interest rate of player i; and na,O is avector representing the initial
number of fish of each age group.
An important but self-evident component of this game is that players are jointly
constrained by the population dynamics of the fish stock. Nature is introduced (as a
player) in the game with the sole purpose of ensuring that the joint constraints are
enforced. The decision variable of nature is thus the stock level - its objective being to
ensure the feasibility of the stock dynamics. Formally, nature's objective is expressed
as O if the stock dynamics is feasible, and - 00 otherwise.
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It is worth mentioning here that unless players enjoy bequest, they wil typically drive
the fishable age groups of the stock to the open access equilibruim level at the end of
the game, if the terminal restriction is simply na,S+ 1 ~ O, 't a. To counteract this
tendency, one can exogeneously impose the more restrictive constraint, na S+ 1 ~ ña,
,
where ña is a certain minimum leve! of the stock of age group a that must be in the
habitat at the end of period S+ 1. This is what is done here. Alternatively, this
restriction can be imposed endogeneously by obliging the players to enter into a
stationar regime maintaining constant catches and keeping escapment fixed from S
onwards.
Stock dynamics
Let the stock dynamics of the biomass of fish in numbers na s (that is, the joint
, ,
constraint mentioned above) be described by
no,s :: f(Bs-)'
na,s +ha,s:: I;a-ina-i,s-i' for O c: a c: A
(9) nA s +hA s:: I;AnA s-I + I;A-inA-1 s-I'i ,. ,
where f(Bs_i = aBs_I J l'S h B H L . 8 f .t e everton- o t recruitment unctlOn;
1 + yBs_1
Bs_I = L Pa W sa na,s_1 represents the post-catch biomass in numbers; Pa is the
a
proportion of mature fish of age a; Ws a is the weight at spawning of fish of age a; a9
,
and r are constant parameters chosen to give a maximum stock size of about 6 million
tonnes - a number considered to be the approximate caring capacity of the habitatlO;
l; a is the natural survival rate of fish of age a; and ha,s defined earlier, denotes the
combined harvest of fish of age a, in fishing season s by all agents.
4.0 NumerIcal method
An algorithm is developed to resolve the second stage game problem, that is to fin d
the answer to the following question: given the fixed capacity choice of the players in
stage one of the game, what leve! of capacity utilization should they choose in each
fishing period so as to maximize their respective economic benefits? For detailed
discussions of the theoretical basis for the algorithm see in paricular Flåm (1993),
and also Sumaila (1993). In what follows, we briefly outline the conceptual algorithm
and describe in concrete terms its practical implementation, the detailed problem-
specific algorithm is relegated to an appendix.
8 In this model, recruitment refers to the number of age zero fish that enter the habitat in each fishing
period.
9 a = nO), is the number of recruits per unit weight of biomass "at zero" or the polutation leve!.
io Researchers at the Institute of Marine Research, Bergen, estimate the maximum sustainable yield
(MSY) stock leve! to be about 3 milion tonnes: With an assumption that the MSY stock level is one
half of the pristine stock level we get the figure of 6 milion tonnes.
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Suppose for ilustrative purposes that all constraints (except nonnegativity ones) are
incorporated into one concave restriction of the form q, (n, ei, e-i) ~ O, where e-i is the
profie of c ap ac it y utilisation of i's rival, ei is the equivalent for player i, and n is the
stock profie (note that n E R(A+l),S, and ei E RS are large vectors, hence, the a and s
subscripts are ignored here). Then we can state the payoff function of player i as
follows
(10)
Il¡(k) = Il¡(ki,k_¡)= ~ax Li (n *,ei,e:¡,y* ,k)i
where
(11)
s
L. (n,e.,e .,y,k)= "'õS(r. -k.m. )+yq,-(n,e.,e .,k)i i -1 ~ i I,S I 't1,8 i -I
s=1
is a modified Lagrangian, y is the Lagrange multiplier, (e;,n* ,y*) are equilibrium
solutions of the variables in question, and q, - is given by min(O, q,). The adjustment
rules in the algorithm are then given by
(12)
. dL¡(n,e¡,e_i,y,k)e¡ = ~ '
oe.i
't i
(13)
ý = _ dLi (n,ei,e_¡,y, k) = _q,_
dY
(14)
dq,-n = y-
dn
h dL i (. ) d dL i (. ) h . L d" f L ( ) . h dw ere an are t e paria erivatives o i. wit respect to ei an y,de¡ dy
and dq,- is the partial derivative of the constraint function with respect to n.
dn
The algorithm then comes in differential form: Starting at arbitrar initial points (ei, y,
n), the dynamics represented by the adjustment rules are pursued all the way to the
stationar points (e;, n * , y*). Such points s atis fy, by definition, the steady-state
generalized equation system:
o = q,-(n,e¡,e_¡,k),
o E de1 tõ:(r¡.s -k¡\j¡J+yq,-(n,ei ,e_¡,k)l 't i
8
with y* ;: O. It is standard from mathematical programming that individual optimality
and stock feasibility then obtains. The numerical scheme uses Euler's method to
integrate (12), (13), and (14) all the way to the equilbrium solutions (e;, n', y') .
5.0 NumerIcal results
A strategic form for our game is given in table 5.1. To obtain these results, the newly
developed dynamic simulation software package, POWERSIMll, is used as
computational support. The parameter values listed in table 5.0 are used for the
computations. In addition, a and y are set equal to 1.01 and 1.5, respectively, to give
a maximum biomass of 6 millon tonnes for a pristine stock. Based on the survival
rate of cod, ç a is given a value of 0.81. The price parameter V, is set equal to NOK
6.78. The variable costs ('Ô T & 'Ô c) and fixed costs (G'T & G' c) for engaging avessel
are calculated to be (NOK 12.88 & 0.88) and (NOK 15.12 & 0.65) million for T and
C, respectively12. The interest rate, ri, is set equal to 7% as recommended by the
Ministry of Finance of Norway. The initial number of cod of each age group is
calibrated using the 1992 estimate of the stock size of cod in tonnes 13 .
(Table 5.0 in here!)
In table 5.1, rows represent player T's pure strategies kT and columns represent player
C's pure strategies kc. Player T's payoff is placed in the southwest corner of the cell in
a given row and column and the payoff to player C is placed in the northeast corner.
The best payoff for player T in each column and the best payoff to player C in each
row are bold-faced. As an example notice that 19.4 has been bold-faced in cell kT =
65 and kC = 500, since 19.4lies in row kT = 65, this tells us that pure strategy kT = 65
is player T's best reply to a choice of pure strategy kC = 500 by player C.
(Table 5.1 in here!)
Notice that the on ly cell in table 5.1 that has both payoffs bold-faced is that which lies
in row kT = 57 and column kC = 1050. Thus the only pure strategy pair that
constitutes a Nash equilibrium is (57,1050). Each strategy in this pair is a best reply to
the other. This gives total PV of economic benefit equal to
III (57,1050) = NOK 25.87 
bilion, with ilT (57,1050) = NOK 11.84 bilion and
Ile (57,1050) = NOK 14.03 bilion, respectively.
(Table 5.2 in here!)
l i Powersim is a dynamic simulation software package developed by ModellData AS in Bergen,
Norway. The model has many powerful features, including the abilty to proeess array variables.
12 The price per kilogram of NOK 6.78 is taken from table 22 in Central Bureau of Statistics of
Norway (1989-1990). The parameters 'Ô i and G' i are calculated using cost data in
Lønnsomhetsundersøkelser (1979 - 1990) .
13 The 1992 stock size is estimated at 1.8 milion tonnes (Ressursoversikt, 1993).
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The overall PV of economic rents from the fishery as a function of kT and kc are
given in table 5.2. The entries in each cell of this table are simply the sum of the
entries in corresponding cells in table 5.1. These results indicate an optimal fleet
consisting of 1100 coastal vessels and no trawlers with PV of economic rent equal to
NOK 36.11 bilion, or NOK 32.83 millon per vessel. In contrast, a discounted profit
maximising fleet consisting solely of trawlers would be made up of 70 vessels and
earn a PV of economic rent of NOK 32.42 bilion, or NOK 463.14 millon per vessel.
The model thus appears to support the general theoretical assertion that non-
cooperation generally results in rent dissipation through the use of excess fishing
capacity. The economic theory of fisheries predicts that in an open access fishery,
economic rent would normally be dissipated completely (Gordon, 1954; Hannesson,
1993). Table 5.2 indicates that a trawl-coastal fishery vessel comgination of a litte
over 120-2500 vessels would dissipate discounted economic rent from the fishery to
niL. Thus, this vessel combination or its equivalent, is our models prediction of the
open access fishing capacity. ff the agents in the fishery were to receive subsidies
totally NOK 9.48 bilion (in present value) in addition to having open access to the
resource, the n the model's prediction of fishing capacity is 140 trawlers and 3000
coastal vessels or their equivalent. It should be interesting to compare the equilibrium
stock and harest profies that would result under "open access plus subsidy", open
access, Nash non-cooperative, and the sole ownership equilibria. This is done
graphically in figures 5.1 and 5.2 below. The figures ilustrate clearly the adverse
effects of "open access plus subsidy", open access, Nash non-cooperative equilibria as
compared to the optimal solution.
(Figures 5.1 and 5.2 in here!)
Notice that contrar to expectations, the biomass is not completely depleted at the end
of the game. There are two possible reasons for this. In the first place players are not
allowed to exploit all age groups of fish. Secondly, even if this was allowed, it would
not be economically profitable to catch every single fish available.
5.1 Perfect maUeability versus perfeet non-maUeability
We label the model in Sumaila (1994) the perfect malleable capital model and that in
this paper the perfect non-malleable capital model. The purpose here is to compare
the capacity investments and the PV of economic rent accruable to the players both
individually and to society at large, in the two models. To do this, the perfect
malleable model is run using comparable prices and costs. Table 5.3 below gives the
capacity predictions of the two models, and the PV of economic rents to the players
when both agents are active; when only T is active; and when only C is active. It is
seen from this table that vessel capacity investment varies from year to year in the
case of the malleable capital modeL.
(Table 5.3 in here!)
A possible interpretation here is that each player evaluates his optimal capacity
requirement in a given year and then rents precisely this quantity from a rental firm
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for fishing vesselsl4. For instance, when both are active, T's optimal vessel size varies
from a high of 65 in the third year to a low of 41 trawlers in year 15, while C's varies
from a high of 939 in year 3 to a low of 564 in the last year. In the non-malleable
capital model, however, T's ex ante fixed capacity investment is 57 trawlers, and the
corresponding capacity investment for C is 1050 coastal vessels.
The economic results given by the two models are given in the third column of table
5.3. Two important observations can be made from this table. First, the maximum
economic rent from the resource are different in the two models: NOK 44.53 bilion is
achieved in the malleable capital model and NOK 36.11 in the non-malleable one.
The higher PV of economic rent achievable in the malleable capital model can be
attributed to the removal of the restriction that non-malleability of capital imposes on
the agents. The negative impact of this restriction is quite substantial, reaching up to
about NOK 12 billon (or 47% of what is achievable under the restriction) in the case
of the Nash equilibrium solution. This c1early demonstrates that there is much to be
gained from establishing rental firms for fishing vessels. Or rather, by allowing
mobility of vessels between different stockS15.
Second, in both models the best economic results are achieved when C operates the
fishery alone. However, the superiority of C becomes sharer in the non-malleable
capital model: There is a difference of well over 10% (in favour of C) in the PV of
economic rent accruable in the non-malleable capital model. In the ma1leable capital
model, however, a difference of only about 5% is noted. This finding may have to do
with the relatively high fixed cost of trawlers and the fact that fixed costs must be
taken as given by the players in the non-malleable capital model.
5.2 Comparison with available data on the Arcto-Norwegian cod fishery
It is stated in section 2 that in 1991 the equivalent of fishing capacity of about 638
coastal vessels and 58 trawlers were operated by Norwegian fishers to land 130 and
270 thousand tonnes of cod, respectively. This implies that catch per trawler is about
4655 tonnes and catch per coastal fishery vessel is 203 tonnes. Now, the Nash
equilibrium strategi es stipulate vessel sizes of 1050 for C and 57 for T. Together,
these capacities are used to land an average of about 842 thousand tonnes a yearl6. Of
the total, trawlers land 412 thousand tonnes and the coastal fishery vessels 430
thousand tonnes. Thus catch per vessel are 7228 and 410 tonnes for a trawler and
coastal fishery vessel, respectively. These numbers signify the incidence of
overcapacity in the Arcto-Norwegian cod fishery even in comparison to the results
from a non-cooperative solution. Comparison with the sole owner's optimal solution
reve als an even greater degree of overcapacity in the fishery: In this case 1 100 vessels
are used to land on average about 770 thousand tonnes of fish per year by C (that is,
700 tonnes per vessel) and 70 trawlers to land an average of about 780 thousand
14 A practicalway to view these variations is that the agents in this model have alternative uses for
their vessel capacities, thereby making it possible for them to divert excess capacity in any given year
to such uses.
15 Hannesson (1993) looks more closely at the possible gains from allowing mobility of vessels
between different stoeks.
16 Note that these harvests comprise both Norwegian and Russian landings, since we do not
differentiate between the two in OUT model.
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tonnes per year by T (well over 10000 tonnes per vessel). A catch per trawl vessel of
10000 tonnes per year appears to be high, probably the proportionality assumption
(underlying the harvest function) between the stock size and the catch per vessel is
appropriate only when variation in the stock size is not too large.
5.3 Effect of fixed costs, interest rates, initial stock size, and terminal
constraint
Fixed costs Sensitivity analysis shows that (for the game solution), theelasticity of the
PV of economic benefits accruable to the players T and C with respect to fixed costs
are about -0.7 and -0.4, respectively17. Hence, to achieve the higher discounted
economic rent, T needs a drop in its fixed costs relative to those of C of about 28%.
The equivalent elasticities in the sole owner solutions are -0.3 for T and -0.2 for C,
which implies that T needs a drop in its fixed costs relative to those of C of about
39% to take over from C as the producer of the optimal solution. We also investigated
the effects of zero fixed costs. This is the same as assuming that fixed costs are
considered to be "sunk" by the agents. Under such an assumption, C and T achieve
discounted economic rents of NOK 20.27 and 19.7 bilion, respectively, in the game
situation, and NOK 42.06 (C) and 42.64 (T) in the sole ownership solutions. We see
that the previously c1ear superiority of C is now neutralised to a great extent.
Interest rates For the game situation, we found that a 1 % drop in the interest rate
faced by both players results in a 1 % increase in the relative profitabilityl8 of T. On
the other hand, an equivalent drop in the interest rate in the sole ownership scenario
leads to an increase of 0.5% in the relative profitability of C. Intuitively, it is not
difficult to understand why T does relatively better in the game situation while C does
relatively better in the sole ownership case: Since T harvests everyhing from age
group 4 and above, while C harests only age groups 7 and above, it is no wonder that
T is the one best positioned to capitalize on the increase in patience that a decrease in
interest rate entails. C does better in the sole ownership scenario because an increase
in patience pl us the fact that C harests fish from age group 7 and above means that a
larger proportion of the stock wil reach maximum weight before they are harvested,
thereby resulting in better relative profitabilty for C.
Initial stock size To investigate the effect of the initial stock size on the relative
profitability of the agents, the model is re-run with 50% and 150% of the base stock
size of 1.8 millon tonnes. The results we obtained indicate that in the sole ownership
solutions, Timproves it's relative profitability as the stock size increases; from
86.85% when the stock size is only 50% of the base case to 92.1% when the stock
size is 150% of the base case. The effect of stock size on the relative profitability of
the agents in the game solution is however not that c1ear: T increases it's relative
profitability both when the stock size is only 50% of the original (90.6% as against
84.4% in the base case) and when the stock size is 150% of the base stock size. In this
case T's relative profitability is 92.3%. As these numbers show T's relative
17 Recall that the elasticity of a function, f(x,y), with respect to x is defined as the percentage increase
in f(x,y) resulting from a 1 % increase in x. .
18 Relative profitability is defined as discounted economic rent to T divided by discounted economic
rent to C multiplied by 100.
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profitability increases by a larger margin when the stock size increases than when it
decreases.
Terminal constraint on the stock size to be left behind at the end of the game A
requirement that not less that 50% of the initial stock size should be left in the sea at
the end of the game changes the outcome of the game significantly in the game
situation. In the sole ownerhip situation, however, the same solutions as in the base
case are obtained, mainly because this constraint is not binding in these cases. Under
such a requirement it turns out that T comes out better (in contrast to the base case
where it is C that does better) , eaming NOK 15.97 billon as against C's NOK 12.98
bilion. An important point to note here is that the introduction of the terminal
constraint, in the game environment, leads to an increase in the overall benefit from
the fishery from NOK 25.87 to NOK 28.95 bilion. This explains why economists
advocate regulation when common property resources are exploited in non-
cooperative environments.
6.0 Concluding remarks
The main findings of this study can be stated as follows: The optimal capacity
investments in terms of number of vessels for T and C in a competitive, non-
cooperative environment are 57 trawlers and 1050 coastal vessels, respectively. The
use of these capacities results in discounted benefits of NOK 11.84 and 14.03 bilion,
respectively, to T and C, and an overall discounted economic benefit of NOK 25.85
bilion to society at large. Using only T and C vessels in the exploitation of the
resource, the optimal fleet sizes are 70 and 1100, respectively. In these cases the PV
of economic rents are NOK 32.42 and 36.11 for T and C. We also found out that, as
expected, the results obtained are rather sensitive to perturbations in fixed costs,
interest rates, initial stock size and the terminal constraint.
It is in order to state here that given that modeling and computation are always
exercises in successive approximation (Clark & Kirkwood, 1979), our estimates
should not be taken toa literally. Having said this, the results of the analysis indicate
that in its current state the Arcto-Norwegian cod fishery appears to suffer from over
capacity. Hence, the practical implication of this study with respect to efficient
management of the resource is that the excess capacity should be run down as rapidly
as possible to a certain leve1'9 somewhere above the Nash equilibriumcapacity level.
Thereafter the remaining excess capacity is allowed to depreciate to the "desired"
leve! by itself. From then on new capacity investment is undertaken only to make up
for depreciation. This would ensure each player his best possible outcome and the
society the second best solution.
The practical implication of the results obtained would have been somewhat different
if the fishery were under-exploited. In this case, we distinguish between starting a
completely new fishery and the case where fishing is currently in progress. In the case
of a new fishery, there is a real possibility for realising the first best solution by
allowing only C to exploit the resource with a capacity size of about 1100 coastal
19 The choice of this level wil depend on both the depreciation rate and the difference between the
cost of acquiring a new vessel and the disinvestment resale price of the vessels relative to the price of
new vessels.
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fishery vessels. However, if political, social and cultural realities dictate the
paricipation of both players and this were to be in a non-cooperative environment,
then each player should aspire to star off with its Nash equilibrium capacity size as
computed herein.
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Appendix
The algorithm. The following non-standard Lagrangian function for player i follows
from our model:
S
Li (n,e,y,k) = L
s=1
õ~ (ri,s - ki \ji,S)+ y o,s(f(Bs_1) - no,s)-
+y A,s(ÇAnA,s-1 + ÇA-inA-I,s-1 - nA,s - hA,sf
A-I
+"y (j: n -n -h )-~ a,t ':a-I a-l,s-I a,s a,s
a=1
where y := Ya,s is the player-invariant, but age and season-variant multipliers, and all
other variables are as defined earlier.
The negative superscript on some components of the equation above is a device
introduced to ensure monotone convergence of multipliers by focusing attention on
the situations where there are constraint violations. Such a device results in
multipliers that are different from those associated with the c1assical Lagrangians.
There is a relationship between the two kinds of multipliers, however, the exact
relationships are not so easy to retrieve. It is therefore necessar, at this juncture, to
call for caution when interpreting the computed equilibrium multiplier leveis.
The gradient information obtainable from Lï(n,e,y), gives the adjustment equations for
the effort leve Is and multipliers. We first introduce a special (switch) function related
to the derivative of ~ -, before we state the adjustment equations. Let the function
H (r) = 1 if roeO, and H (r) = O otherwise. ff r ~ O were a constraint inequality, then
H(r) wil attain a value of 1 if the constraint is violated, otherwise it attains a value of
O. In writing the adjustment equations below, this switch function is used.
Staring at arbitrar initial guesses of y a,t' na,t and ei,t ' we pursue the dynamics given
by the adjustment equations below, all the way to the equilibrium solutions.
Effort adjustment. The adjustment equation for effort given by dLi (.) is
dei,s
ei,S = Õ~(L Vi waq¡,akina,s - k¡'Ô¡e~s)
a
A-I
+ LY a,sH( Ça_ina_i,s_i - na,s - haJ( -qi,ak¡naJ
ad
+ Y A,sH(çAnA,s_1 + ÇA_inA_I,s_1 - nA,s - hA,sX -q¡,Ak¡nA,s)
Multiplier adjustment. The equations for the sequential adjustment of the
multipliers are obtained by taking the negative of the partial differential of Li with
respect to the appropriate multiplier, that is, they come from _ dLi (.) .
dYa,s
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For age gro up zero fish, the multi pli er is adjusted according to the equation
YO,s = -HCfCBs-i)-no,s)CfCBs-i) -no,s)
Multipliers for fish of age groups between 1 and A- 1 are adjusted as follows
y a,s = -HC~a-ina-l,s-i - na,s - ha,s)C~a-lna-l,s-1 - na,s - ha,s)
For the last age group, multiplier adjustment is according to
y A,s = -HC~AnA,s-1 + ~A-inA-i,s-1 - nA,s - hA,s)C~AnA,s-1 + ~A-inA-I,S-1 - nA,s - hA,s)
Here, the RHS of the equations are calculated and then the corresponding multipliers
adjusted according to the magnitude and direction of the ca1culated res ult.
Nature's adjustment of the stock leveL. Natures objective can be expressed as
LN =Yo,s(fCBs-i)-no,sf
A-I
+ L y a,s C~a-ina-I,S-i - na,s - ha,s)-
a=1
+YA,sC~AnA,S-¡ +~A-inA-i,s-i -nA,s -hA,s)-
This equation is deri ved from the fact that once the stock dynamics is obeyed, nature's
net benefit is O, hence, LN consist of only the constraint equations.
The updating rules for age groups, a=O, a=1,...,A-2, a=A-l, and a=A are different and
are given below separately. These are obtained by parially differentiating LNC.) with
respect to the corresponding stock level. That is, they come from dL N (.) .
dnai,s
(1) The stock level of age zero fish is adjusted sequentially in accordance with the
equation,
. dB
no,s = Yo,s+iHCfCBs) - no,s+i )f'CBJ~
o,S
- Yo,sHCfCBs_i) - no)
+ YI,s+IHC~onO,t - n¡,s+i - hi,s+i )~o
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(2) Fish of age groups between 1 and A-2 are updated as follows,
. aB
na,s = y o,s+iHCfCBJ - no,s+i)f'CBs)~
a,s
+ Ya,sHCça-ina-l,s-l-na,s -ha,s)C-l- Lqi,ak¡e¡)
+ Ya+l,s+IHC Çana,s - na+l,s+1 - ha+i,s+i)ça
(3) The last but one age gro up of fish CLe., the A-I age group) is adjusted II
accordance to the equation,
. aB
nA-I,s =Yos+iHCfCBs)-nos+i)f'CBs)a S, , nA-I,s
+ y A-i,sHCÇA-inA-i,s-i - nA-i,s - hA_1)C- 1 - Lq¡,A-ikie¡,s)
p
+ y A,s+IHCÇAnA,S + ÇA-lnA-i,s - nA,s+1 - hA,s+l)çA-I
(4) Finally, the last age group, is updated using the following equation,
. , dBs
nA,s =Yo,s+IHCfCBJ- no,s+i)f CBs)-;
onA,s
+ y A,s+iHCçAnA,s + ÇA-inA-i,s - nA,s+1 - hA,s+l)çA
+ y A,sHCçAnA,s-i + ÇA-inA-I,S-1 - nA,s - hA,sX - 1 - L q¡,Ak¡e¡J
i
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Table 2.1: No. of Norwegian vessls operating on the 'cod fishes
group. for five different yeara.
Trawlera Coastal vesss
Year
1991 57 562
1990 51 572
1988 84 661
1986 118 828
1984 128 718
Table 5.0: Value8 of parameters use in the mod
Selectivity Weight at Welght in
q(p,a) spawning w(s,a) catch w(a)
.1 -2 k k
O O 0.090 0.10
O O 0.270 0.30
O O 0.540 0.6
O O 0.900 1.00
0.0074 O 1.260 1.40
0.0074 O 1.647 1.83
0.0074 O 2.034 2.26
0.0074 0.00593 2.943 3.27
0.0074 0.00593 3.843 4.27
0.0074 0.00593 5.202 5.78
0.0074 0.00593 7.164 7.96
0.0074 0.00593 8.811 9.79
0.0074 0.00593 1.0377 11.53
0.0074 0.00593 12.456 13.84
0.0074 0.00593 13.716 15.24
0.0074 0.00593 14.706 16.34
Note: (1) The values for q(p,a) are calculated using the proceure outlined in Sumaila
(1994). (2) Player T exploits fish of age 4 and above and player C fish of age
group 7 and above (Hannesson, 1993).
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Table 5.3: MaJleable va. Non-maJleabie caitaJ. Give. the equilbrium vess .ize anlhe overal discnted ecie ret that
acerue. lo soety from the resourc.
Vess .ize (in numbera) PV of ecnomie benefit (in billio NOK)
MaJleble Non-malleable MaJleable NonaJleabie
80th aelive (65 -41; 939.56) (57;1050) 38.28 25.87
T aelive (80 .49) (70) 42.35 32.42
C aelive 11153.761) (1100) 44.53 36.11
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Fig 5.1: Stock prfiles (in millon tonnes): llustrs the post-catch stock size in each
period for open access plus sub~idy (OAS), open acess (OA), Nash equilbrium (N), T
only and C only (the opti solution).
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Fig. 5.2: Harest profi es (in millon tonnes): llustrs tota harest in eah peod for
open access plus subsidy (OAS), open acess (OA), Nash equilibrium (N), T only and
C only (the optima solution).
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1.0 Introduction
This paper considers non-cooperative use of a common property fish stock, namely
the Arcto-Norwegian cod. Attention is focused on a restricted access fishery where
only two-agents participate in the exploitation of the resource, the aim being to
predict the number of vessels that each agent in such a situation wil fin d in his best
interest to employ. An important although self-evident aspect of the game is that both
agents are jointly constrained by the population dynamics of the resource. The key
assumption of the paper is that players undertake investment in capital that is
irreversible. This assumption is quite realistic because capital embodied in fishing
vessels is often non-malleable: Non-malleability is used here to refer to the existence
of constraints upon the disinvestment of capital assets utilized in the exploitation of
the resource (Clark et aL. 1979). This implies that once a fishing firm or authority
invests in a fleet of vessels it either has to keep it until the fleet is depreciated, or else
the vessels can only be disposed off at considerable economic loss.
A number of papers have appeared in the fishery economics literature that focus,
among other things, on the irreversibility of capital employed in the exploitation of
fishery resources. Examples inc1ude Clark et aL. (1979), Clark & Kirkwood (1979),
Dudley & Waugh (1980), Charles (1983a, 1983b), and Charles & Munro (1985). We
are, however, not aware of any prior work that models, computes numerically and
analyses the exploitation of fishery resources as done in this paper. Among the
examples cited above, only Dudley & Waugh (1980) consider investment decision in
a fishery with more than a single agent participating. But even in this case, only
qualitative statements of the likely effects of this are made. The study of Clark &
Kirkwood (1979) is c10se to the work planned herein, at least in terms of the kind of
questions they address. The authors presented a bioeconomic model that predicts the
number of vessels of each of the two types entering the prawn fishery of the Gulf of
Carpentaria under free access. In addition, they estimated the economically optimal
number of vessels of each type. The results they obtained are then compared with
available data on the prawn fishery of the Gulf of Carpentaria.
These are issues we also address here albeit with a number of differences. First, there
is a difference with respect to the number of agents in the two studies: While Clark &
Kirkwood (1979) consider the social planner's and open access equilibrium fleet sizes,
we compute equilbrium fleet sizes that wil emerge in a non-cooperative environment
involving two agents, and then, using these results, we derive the social planner's
equilbrium fleet size and discuss the probable open access equilibrium fishing
capacity. Thus, we add a new dimension to the discussion, namely, the two-agent
analysisl. Second, there is a difference in the way we model the population dynamics
of the fish stock: While their study prescribes and uses a single cohort to describe the
fish stock, we accommodate a multicohort population structure.
The primar concern of this study is to develop the necessary framework to
(1) identify a Nash non-cooperative equilibrium solution for a bimatrix game
involving the trawl and coastal fisheries operating on the Arcto-Norwegian cod;
i The motivation for undertaking a two-agent analysis is given in section 2 of this paper.
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(2) identify the sole owner equilibrium solutions for the two tïsheries, and determine
which among these gives the optimal solution;
(3) compare the results in (1) and (2) above to (i) the results in Sumaila (1994), where
perfect malleability of capital is assumed implicitly, and (ii) with available data on the
Arcto- Norwegian cod. The former comparison would put us in a position to say
something about the possible gains of establishing rental firms for fishing vessels
and/or allowing mobility of vessels between different stocks;
(4) discuss the fishing capacities that are likely to emerge in an open access scenario;
and
(5) investigate the effect of fixed cost, interest rates, initial stock size, and the
terminal constraint, on the relative profitability of the players.
The next section gives a brief description of the Arcto-Norwegian cod fishery. Section
3 presents the model, a special feature of which is the explicit modeling of the
biologically and economically important age groups of cod. This is followed by a
brief mention of the algorithm for the computation of the equilbrium solutions: The
detailed algorithm is relegated to an appendix. In section 5, the results of the study are
stated. Finally, section 6 conc1udes the paper.
2.0 The Arcto-Norwegian cod fishery
The Arcto-Norwegian cod, gadus morhua, is a member of the Atlantic cod family,
arguably among the world's most important fish species. It inhabits the continental
shelf from shoreline to 600 m depth, or even deeper, usually 150-200 m. It is
gregarious in behaviour, forming shoals or schools and undertaking spawning and
feeding migrations. The diet of adult cod is variable and consists mainly of herring,
capelin, haddock and codling. The Arcto-Norwegian cod spawns only along the
Norwegian coast, mainly in Lofoten in April-March. Typically, it starts spawning at
the age of 7-8 years; eggs are caried by the gulf stream, over the coast where they
hatch, and into the Barents Sea, up towards Svalbard, where the young cod grow. It
has a relatively long li fe span: it can live for well over 15 years. A majority of young
cod die quite earlY' either because of a lack of adequate food, or because they are
eaten up by other fishes. Young cod between the ages of 3-6 come to the Finnmark's
coast every year. This is because mature capelin, which cod preys on, move to their
spawning spots c10se to the Finnmark's coast. Cod follows and predates them, thus
resulting in good spring cod in the period April to June.
I
The Arcto-Norwegian cod is a shared resource jointly managed by Norway and
Russia. Norwegian fishers employ mainly coastal and trawl fishery vessels in the
exploitation of the resource, while their Russian counterparts employ mainly trawlers.
Table 2.1 gives the number of Norwegian trawl and coastal fishery vessels (of 13m
longest length and over) that operated on the "cod fishes group2" for five different
years. In addition to this comes the part of the fishing capacity employed to exploit
2 The cod fishes group include, the Arcto-Norwegian cod, the Arcto-Norwegian haddock, whiting,
Greenland halibut, saith, etc.
2
other species, say, the "herring fishes group" that are used to land the cod fishes as
bycatch.
(Table 2.1 in here!)
Using Norwegian data3, we ca1culated the number of coastal fishery vessels and
traw lers used by Norwegian fishers in the exploitation of the cod fishes group in 1991
to be about 638 and 58, respectively. These landed about 130 and 270 thousand
tonnes of co d, respectively.
To facilitate our analysis three simplifications (about this fishery) are made4. First,
only Norwegian prices and costs are used in the analysis. Second, the vessel types
employed in the exploitation of the resource are grouped into two broad categories,
namely, the coastal and the trawl fisheries, and placed under the management of two
separate and distinct management authorities, henceforth to be known as Coastal
Fisheries Management (C), and Trawl Fisheries Management (T). Third, only the
most cost effective vesselss in each of these categories are assumed to be employed in
the exploitation of the resource. The assignment of two separate and distinct fleets to
the two management authorities captures, to some extent, the division of the stock
between Norway and Russia, but even in Norway a division is usually made between
the coastal fleet and the trawlers, and the Norwegian quota is divided between these.
3.0 The model
The model presented here builds on that discussed in Sumaila (1994), to which the
reader is referred for details. Here, a two-stage, two-player, dynamic, deterministic,
non-cooperative game model is put together, the two players bein g T and C. By a
game we mean a normal (strategic) form, simultaneous-move game in which both
players make their investment decisions in ignorance of the decision of the other. At
stage one of the game, each player invests in fishing capacity ex ante, having in mind
that such investment is irreversible. Then in stage two the players employ their chosen
capacity investment to exploit the shared resource for the next 15 years, subject to the
stock dynamics and nonnegativity constraints.
Both T and C are assumed to be rational and act here to maximize their discounted
profit (payoff) function Il : KT x Kc --9\, where KT and Kc are the pure strategy
sets of player i = T, C, that is, the set of fishing capacity (number of vessels or fleet
size) that a player can choose from. Player i's payoff at an outcome (kT,kc) is then
given by Il (kT, kc). A major aim of this modeling exercise is to find the strategy
pair (k~, k~) such that no player wil find it in his interest to change strategy given
that his opponent keeps to his. In other words, we are interested in finding Nash non~
cooperative equilibrium in a two-player fishery game, where k~ is a best reply to k~
and vice versa. This is equivalent to stipulating that the inequalities
3 Data in tables E21 - E51 in Lønnsomhetsundersøkelser (1979 - 1990) were used for the ca1culations.
4 See Sumaila (1994) for the justifications for these simplifications.
5 Cost effectiveness is defined here in terms of least cost per kilogram of fish landed.
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(1)
* * *
IlTCkT,kC) ;: IlTCkT,kC)
* * *
IlCCkT,kC) ;:IlCCkT,kC)
hold for all feasible kT and kc.
3.1 On existence of Nash equilibrium
Nash (1950, 1951) proved the existence of equilbrium points under certain
assumptions on each player's strategy space and corresponding payoff function.
Essentially, he dealt with matrix games. Rosen (1965) went further to show that when
every joint strategy lie in a convex, closed, and bounded region in the product space
and each player's payoff function IT i' i = T, C is con ca ve in his own strategy and
continuous in all variables, then there is at least one Nash equilibrium of the game.
This res ult is stated in theorem 1 below.
THEOREM 1 CExistence of Nash equilbrium, Rosen (1965)): An equiUbrium point
exist for every concave n-person game.
The game we formulate in this paper is a concave 2-person game, and hence satisfies
the above theorem. We can therefore expect at least one Nash equilbrium to exist in
our game.
3.2 On uniqueness of Nash equilibrium
Two steps are taken here to deal with the vexing problem of equilibrium selection.
Step 1: Only open loop strategies are allowed in the second stage of the game6. That
is, each player commits, in advance, his fishing capacity to a fixed time function
rather than a fixed control law Cc10sed loop strategies). Note that unlike in the case of
fixed control laws, where the choice of control depends on the past history of the
game, fixed time functions are independent of the actions of the opponent so far in
the game. In information theoretie sense open loop corresponds to the receipt of no
information during play, while c10sed loop represents full information.
The main reason we stick to open loop strategies, even though it is not likely to lead
us to c10sed form solutions, is that it would be practically impossible to compute the
predictions of our model if c10sed loop strategies were allowed. This is because
c10sed loop strategies normally entail complex and huge numbers of strategies in
repeated games Csee Binmore, 1982). Another reason is that the new "Folk Theorem
for Dynamic Games" introduced by Gaitsgory and Nitzan (1994), gives us reason to
believe that under certain monotonicity assumptions, the set of c10sed loop solutions
that may emerge from our model may coincide with the open loop solutions we
compute herein.
6 In a sense one can argue that the game we formulate herein is not a "pure" open loop strategy game.
This is because although the fishing capacities are chosen once and for all, the capacity utilization is
chosen in each period depending on the stock size.
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Step 2: The same shadow prices (that is, Lagrange multipliers) are imposed across
both players for resource constraint violation. Flåm (1993) shows that in addition to
this, if the marginal profit correspondence is strictly monotone, then there exists a
unique Nash equilbrium for our game. Incidentally strict monotonicity of marginal
profit correspondence is also a sufficient condition for convergence in our model.
In the presentation of the mathematical equations in the rest of the model, two other
subscripts (a=O,...,A, and s=l,...,S) are used to denote age groups of fish, and time
periods or stages, respectively7. Based on the life expectancy of cod, the last age
group A, is set equal to 15. The finite time horizon of the game, S, is set equal to 15
due to computational limitations.
Catch
Let catch of age group a (in number of fish) by player i in fishing period s, hi,a,s, be
gi ven by
(2)
hi a,s = qi ana,sEi s, , ,
where the effort profie, Ei,s = kiei,s, and ki is the ex ante fixed capacity investment
of player i; e¡,s E (0,1), is the capacity utilisation, that is, the fraction of ki taken out
for fishing in a given year; na,s is the post catch number of fish of age a in fishing
period sand qi,a is the player and age-dependent catchability coefficient, that is, the
share of age group a cod bein g caught by one unit of effort.
Total catch by all players of age group a in period s can thus be written as
(3)
ha,s = Lqi,a na,skiei,s
l
Total catch in weight by all players over all age groups in periods is given by
(4)
hs = Lha,swa
a
where Wa is the weight of fish of age group a.
Costs and Prices
The fishery is assumed to face perfectly elastic demand. Thus, the ex-vessel seIlng
price of fish per kilogram, V, is assumed to be constant. The harvesting costs per
vessel employed by player i in period s, '1 i,s consist of fixed costs (~¡) and variable
costs (t) ¡) which are proportionate to ei,s,
(5)
t)¡ L +b
'I¡,s =~¡ +-e¡,s
(1+b)
7 Recall that the subscript denoting player is i = T, C.
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where b = 0.01. This formulation of the cost function ensures strict concavity of
individual profit as a function of individual effort. This strictness is important for the
sake of convergence.
Revenue
The revenue to player i, in period s, ri,s, comes from the sale of his catch over all age
groups in that period, that is,
(6)
ri,s = vI. w ah~a,s
a
Profits
Player i's profit in a given period sis then given by the equation
(7) 1ti,s(ns,e¡,J = ri,s - ki'Vi,s
where k = (ki,k-i). Note that 1ti s is a function of the actual fish abundance in aperiod,
ns, and own effort of a player in that period. We restrict our analysis to the case of
perfectly non-malleable capital in which the depreciation rate is equal to zero and
capital has a negligible scrap value. Even though this simplification is not quite
realistic, the qualitative effect of this is expected to be insignificant. The profit
function given by equation (7) is formulated to incorporate this restriction.
Objective
Given ki, the second stage problem of player i is to find a sequence of capacity
utilization, ei,s (s=I,2,...,S), to maximise his present value (PV) of profits (payoff),
that is,
(8)
s
ni (kT ,kc) = ~ax LO~1ti (ns ,ei,s)
i s=1
subject to the stock dynamics (see below) and the obvious nonnegativity constraints,
expressed mathematically as ei,s;: O, for all i and s; na,s;: O, for all a and s;
na,S+ 1;: O, for all a; and na,O;: O given. Here, o¡ = (1 + ri t is the discount factor; ri
;: O denotes the interest rate of player i; and na,O is avector representing the initial
number of fish of each age group.
An important but self-evident component of this game is that players are jointly
constrained by the population dynamics of the fish stock. Nature is introduced (as a
player) in the game with the sole purpose of ensuring that the joint constraints are
enforced. The decision variable of nature is thus the stock leve! - its objective being to
ensure the feasibilty of the stock dynamics. Formally, nature's objective is expressed
as O if the stock dynamics is feasible, and - 00 otherwise.
6
It is worth mentioning here that unless players enjoy bequest, they wil typically drive
the fishable age groups of the stock to the open access equilbruim leve! at the end of
the game, if the terminal restriction is simply na S+ 1 ;2 O, Va. To counteract this
,
tendency, one can exogeneously impose the more restrictive constraint, na S+ L ;2ña,
,
where ña is a certain minimum leve! of the stock of age group a that must be in the
habitat at the end of period S+ 1. This is what is done here. Alternatively, this
restriction can be imposed endogeneously by obliging the players to enter into a
stationary regime maintaining constant catches and keeping escapment fixed from S
onwards.
Stock dynamics
Let the stock dynamics of the biomass of fish in numbers na s (that is, the joint
, ,
constraint mentioned above) be described by
no,s :: f(Bs_1)'
na,s + ha,s :: E,a-I na_i ,s-I' for O -: a -: A
(9) nA,s + hA,s :: E,AnA,S-1 + E,A-inA-I,S-1'
where f(Bs_i = . aBs_i ) is the Beverton-Holt recruitment8 function;
1 + yBs_1
Bs-i = LPa wsana,s_1 represents the post-catch biomass in numbers; Pa is the
a
proportion of mature fish of age a; w s a is the weight at spawning of fish of age a; a 9
,
and y are constant parameters chosen to give a maximum stock size of about 6 million
tonnes - a number considered to be the approximate carrying capacity of the habitatlO;
E, a is the natural survival rate of fish of age a; and ha,s defined earlier, denotes the
combined harvest of fish of age a, in fishing season s by all agents.
4.0 NumerIcal method
An algorithm is developed to resolve the second stage game problem, that is to find
the answer to the following question: given the fixed capacity choice of the players in
stage one of the game, what leve! of capacity utilization should they choose in each
fishing period so as to maximize their respective economic benefits? For detailed
discussions of the theoretical basis for the algorithm see in particular Flåm (1993),
and also Sumaila (1993). In what follows, we briefly outline the conceptual algorithm
and describe in concrete terms its practical implementation, the detailed problem-
specific algorithm is re!egated to an appendix.
8 In this model, recruitment refers to the number of age zero fish that enter the habitat in each fishing
period.
9 a = nO), is the number ofrecruits per unit weight ofbiomass "at zero" or the polutation leveL.
10 Researchers at the Institute of Marine Research, Bergen, estimate the maximum sustainable yield
(MSY) stock level to be about 3 million tonnes: With an assumption that the MSY stock level is one
half of the pristine stock level we get the figure of 6 million tonnes.
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Suppose for ilustrative purposes that all constraints Cexcept nonnegativity ones) are
incorporated into one concave restriction of the form (l Cn, ei, e-i) ;: O, where e-i is the
profie of capacity utilisation of i's rival, ei is the equivalent for player i, and n is the
stock profile Cnote that n E RCA+l),S, and ei E RS are large vectors, hence, the a and s
subscripts are ignored here). Then we can state the payoff function of player i as
follows
(10)
TI¡(k) = TI¡(k¡,k_¡)= max L¡Q:l,e¡,e:¡,y' ,k)
ei
where
(11)
s
L. (n,e., e . ,y, k) = ~ õ8 (r. - k. li. )+ y(l-(n,e.,e . ,k)1 1 -1 ,L i 1,S 1 't1,8 1 -I
8=1
is a modified Lagrangian, y is the Lagrange multiplier, (e:, n' , y') are equilibrium
solutions of the variables in question, and (l - is given by minCO, (l)o The adjustment
rules in the algorithm are then given by
(12)
. aL¡Cn,e¡,e_¡,y,k)e¡ = ~ . ,
oe.1
V i
(13)
. aLi Cn,e¡,e_¡,y, k) (l_Y-- --- 
ay
(14)
a(l-n = y-
an
h aL¡Co) daL¡C.) h 'ld o o fLC) oh dw ere an are t e partia envatives o i. wit respect to ei an y,ae¡ ay
and a(l- is the partial derivative of the constraint function with respect to no
an
The algorithm then comes in differential form: Starting at arbitrar initial points Cei, y,
n), the dynamics represented by the adjustment rules are pursued all the way to the
stationar points (e~, n', y') o Such points satisfy, by definition, the steady-state
generalized equation system:
o = (l-Cn,e¡,e_¡,k),
o E a',i tõ;(r." - k.'I.,,)+yq,-(n,e. ,e_.,k)J. \f i
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with y* ~ O. It is standard from mathematical programming that individual optimality
and stock feasibility then obtains. The numerical scheme uses Euler's method to
integrate (12), (13), and (14) all the way to the equilibrium solutions (e~, n', y') .
5.0 Numerical results
A strategic form for our game is given in table 5.1. To obtain these results, the newly
developed dynamic simulation software package, POWERSIMlI, is used as
computational support. The parameter values listed in table 5.0 are used for the
computations. In addition, a and y are set equal to 1.01 and 1.5, respectively, to give
a maximum biomass of 6 milion tonnes for a pris tine stock. Based on the survival
rate of cod, ç a is given a value of 0.81. The price parameter V, is set equal to NOK
6.78. The variable costs ('ÔT & 'Ôc) and fixed costs (((T & ((c) for engaging avessel
are calculated to be (NOK 12.88 & 0.88) and (NOK 15.12 & 0.65) millon for T and
C, respectively12. The interest rate, ri, is set equal to 7% as recommended by the
Ministry of Finance of Norway. The initial number of cod of each age group is
calibrated using the 1992 estimate of the stock size of cod in tonnes 13.
(Table 5.0 in here!)
In table 5.1, rows represent player T's pure strategies kT and columns represent player
C's pure strategies kc. Player T's payoff is placed in the southwest corner of the cell in
a given row and column and the payoff to player C is placed in the northeast corner.
The best payoff for player T in each column and the best payoff to player C in each
row are bold-faced. As an example notice that 19.4 has been bold-faced in cell kT =
65 and kC = 500, since 19.4lies in row kT = 65, this tells us that pure strategy kT = 65
is player T's best reply to a choice of pure strategy kc = 500 by player C.
(Table 5.1 in here!)
Notice that the only cell in table 5.1 that has both payoffs bold-faced is that which lies
in row kT = 57 and column kc = 1050. Thus the only pure strategy pair that
constitutes a Nash equilbrium is (57,1050). Each strategy in this pair is a best rep ly to
the other. This gives total PV of economic benefit equal to
IJl (57,1050) = NOK 25.87 
bilion, with ilT (57,1050) = NOK 11.84 bilion and
Ilc(57,l050) = NOK 14.03 bilion, respectively.
(Table 5.2 in here!)
11 Powersim is a dynamic simulation software package developed by ModellData AS in Bergen,
Norway. The model has many powerful features, including the ability to proeess array variables.
12 The price per kilogram of NOK 6.78 is taken from table 22 in Central Bureau of Statistics of
Norway (1989-1990). The parameters 'Ô i and (( i are calculated using cost data in
LØnnsomhetsundersøkelser (1979 - 1990) .
13 The 1992 stock size is estimated at 1.8 milion tonnes (Ressursoversikt, 1993).
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The overall PV of economic rents from the fishery as a function of kT and kC are
given in table 5.2. The entries in each cell of this table are simply the sum of the
entries in corresponding cells in table 5.1. These results indicate an optimal fleet
consisting of 1100 coastal vessels and no trawlers with PV of economic rent equal to
NOK 36.11 billon, or NOK 32.83 millon per vessel. In contras t, a discounted profit
maximising fleet consisting solely of trawlers would be made up of 70 vessels and
earn a PV of economic rent of NOK 32.42 bilion, or NOK 463.14 millon per vessel.
The model thus appears to support the general theoretical assertion that non-
cooperation generally results in rent dissipation through the use of excess fishing
capacity. The economic theory of fisheries predicts that in an open access fishery,
economic rent would normally be dissipated completely (Gordon, 1954; Hannesson,
1993). Table 5.2 indicates that a trawl-coastal fishery vessel combination of aliule
over 120-2500 vessels would dissipate discounted economic rent from the fishery to
niL. Thus, this vessel combination or its equivalent, is our models prediction of the
open access fishing capacity. IT the agents in the fishery were to receive subsidies
totally NOK 9.48 bilion (in present value) in addition to having open access to the
resource, then the model's prediction of fishing capacity is 140 trawlers and 3000
coastal vessels or their equivalent. It should be interesting to compare the equilibrium
stock and harvest profiles that would result under "open access plus subsidy", open
access, Nash non-cooperative, and the sole ownership equilibria. This is done
graphically in figures 5.1 and 5.2 below. The figures ilustrate clearly the advers e
effects of "open access plus subsidy", open access, Nash non-cooperative equilibria as
compared to the optimal solution.
(Figures 5.1 and 5.2 in here!)
Notice that contrary to expectations, the biomass is not completely depleted at the end
of the game. There are two possible reasons for this. In the first place players are not
allowed to exploit all age groups of fish. Secondly, even if this was allowed, it would
not be economically profitable to catch every single fish available.
5.1 Perfeet maUeability versus perfeet non-maUeability
We label the model in Sumaila (1994) the perfect malleable capital model and that in
this paper the perfect non-malleable capital model. The purpose here is to compare
the capacity investments and the PV of economic rent accruable to the players both
individually and to society at large, in the two models. To do this, the perfeet
malleable model is run using comparable prices and costs. Table 5.3 below gives the
capacity predictions of the two models, and the PV of economic rents to the players
when both agents are active; when only T is active; and when only C is active. It is
seen from this table that vessel capacity investment varies from year to year in the
case of the malleable capital model.
(Table 5.3 in here!)
A possible interpretation here is that each player evaluates his optimal capacity
requirement in a given year and then rents precisely this quantity from a rental firm
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for fishing vessels14. For instance, when both are active, T's optimal vessel size varies
from a high of 65 in the third year to a low of 41 trawlers in year 15, while C's varies
from a high of 939 in year 3 to a low of 564 in the last year. In the non-malleable
capital model, however, T's ex ante fixed capacity investment is 57 trawlers, and the
corresponding capacity investment for C is 1050 coastal vessels.
The economic results given by the two models are given in the third column of table
5.3. Two important observations can be made from this table. First, the maximum
economic rent from the resource are different in the two models: NOK 44.53 bilion is
achieved in the malleable capital model and NOK 36.11 in the non-malleable one.
The higher PV of economic rent achievable in the malleable capital model can be
attributed to the removal of the restriction that non-malleability of capital imposes on
the agents. The negative impact of this restriction is quite substantial, reaching upto
about NOK 12 bilion (or 47% of what is achievable under the restriction) in the case
of the N ash equilbrium solution. This clearly demonstrates that there is much to be
gained from establishing rental firms for fishing vessels. Or rather, by allowing
mobility of vessels between different stockS15.
Second, in both models the best economic results are achieved when C operates the
fishery alone. However, the superiority of C becomes sharer in the non-malleable
capital model: There is a difference of well over 10% (in favour of C) in the PV of
economic rent accruable in the non-malleable capital model. In the malleable capital
model, however, a difference of only about 5% is noted. This finding may have to do
with the relatively high fixed cost of trawlers and the fact that fixed costs must be
taken as given by the players in the non-malleable capital model.
5.2 Comparison with available data on the Arcto-Norwegian codfishery
It is stated in section 2 that in 1991 the equivalent of fishing capacity of about 638
coastal vessels and 58 trawlers were operated by Norwegian fishers to land 130 and
270 thousand tonnes of cod, respectively. This implies that catch per trawler is about
4655 tonnes and catch per coastal fishery vessel is 203 tonnes. Now, the Nash
equilibrium strategies stipulate vessel sizes of 1050 for C and 57 for T. Together,
these capacities are used to land an average of about 842 thousand tonnes a year16. Of
the total, trawlers land 412 thousand tonnes and the coastal fishery vessels 430
thousand tonnes. Thus catch per vessel are 7228 and 410 tonnes for a trawler and
coastal fishery vessel, respectively. These numbers signify the incidence of
overcapacity in the Arcto-Norwegian cod fishery even in comparison to the results
from a non-cooperative solution. Comparison with the sole owner's optimal solution
reveals an even greater degree of overcapacity in the fishery: In this case 1100 vessels
are used to land on average about 770 thousand tonnes of fish per year by C (that is,
700 tonnes per vessel) and 70 trawlers to land an average of about 780 thousand
14 A practical way to view these variations is that the agents in this model have alternative uses for
their vessel capacities, thereby making it possible for them to divert excess capacity in any given year
to such uses.
15 Hannesson (1993) 100ks more closely at the possible gains from allowing mobility of vessels
between different stoeks.
16 Note that these harvests comprise both Norwegian and Russian landings, since we do not
differentiate between the two in our model.
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tonnes per year by T (well over 10000 tonnes per vessel). A catch per trawl vessel of
10000 tonnes per year appears to be high, probably the proportionality assumption
(underlying the harvest function) between the stock size and the catch per vessel is
appropriate only when variation in the stock size is not too large.
5.3 Effect of fixed costs, interest rates, initial stock size, and terminal
constraint
Fixed costs Sensitivity analysis shows that (for the game solution), the elasticity of the
PV of economic benefits accruable to the players T and C with respect to fixed costs
are about -0.7 and -0.4, respectively17. Hence, to achieve the higher discounted
economic rent, T needs a drop in its fixed costs relative to those of C of about 28%.
The equivalent elasticities in the sole owner solutions are -0.3 for T and -0.2 for C,
which implies that T needs a drop in its fixed costs relative to those of C of about
39% to take over from C as the producer of the optimal solution. We also investigated
the effects of zero fixed costs. This is the same as assuming that fixed costs are
considered to be "sunk" by the agents. Under such an assumption, C and T achieve
discounted economic rents of NOK 20.27 and 19.7 bilion, respectively, in the game
situation, and NOK 42.06 (C) and 42.64 (T) in the sole ownership solutions. We see
that the previously c1ear superiority of C is now neutralised to a great ex tent.
Interest rates For the game situation, we found that a 1 % drop in the interest rate
faced by both players results in a 1 % increase in the relative profitability18 of T. On
the other hand, an equivalent drop in the interest rate in the sole ownership scenario
leads to an increase of 0.5% in the relative profitability of C. Intuitively, it is not
difficult to understand why T does relatively better in the game situation while C do es
relatively better in the sole ownership case: Since T harvests everything from age
group 4 and above, while Charvests only age groups 7 and above, it is no wonder that
T is the one best positioned to capitalize on the increase in patience that a decrease in
interest rate entails. C does better in the sole ownership scenario because an increase
in patience plus the fact that Charvests fish from age group 7 and above means that a
larger proportion of the stock wil reach maximum weight before they are harvested,
thereby resulting in better relative profitability for C.
Initial stock size To investigate the effect of the initial stock size on the relative
profitability of the agents, the model is re-run with 50% and 150% of the base stock
size of 1.8 milion tonnes. The results we obtained indicate that in the sole ownership
solutions, Timproves its relative profitability as the stock size increases; from
86.85% when the stock size is only 50% of the base case to 92.1% when the stock
size is 150% of the base case. The effect of stock size on the relative profitability of
the agents in the game solution is however not that c1ear: T increases its relative
profitability both when the stock size is only 50% of the original (90.6% as against
84.4% in the base case) and when the stock size is 150% of the base stock size. In this
case T's relative profitability is 92.3%. As these numbers show T's relative
17 Recall that the elasticity of a function, f(x,y), with respect to x is defined as the percentage increase
in f(x,y) resulting from a 1 % increase in x.
18 Relative profitability is defined as discounted economic rent to T divided by discounted economic
rent to C multiplied by 100.
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profitability increases by a larger margin when the stock size increases than when it
decreases.
Terminal constraint on the stock size to be left behind at the end of the game A
requirement that not less that 50% of the initial stock size should be left in the sea at
the end of the game changes the outcome of the game significantly in the game
situation. In the sole ownerhip situation, however, the same solutions as in the base
case are obtained, mainly because this constraint is not binding in these cases. Under
such a requirement it turns out that T comes out better (in contrast to the base case
where it is C that does better) , earning NOK 15.97 bilion as against C's NOK 12.98
bilion. An important point to note here is that the introduction of the terminal
constraint, in the game environment, leads to an increase in the overall benefit from
the fishery from NOK 25.87 to NOK 28.95 billon. This explains why economists
advocate regulation when common property resources are exploited in non-
cooperative environments.
6.0 Concluding remarks
The main findings of this study can be stated as follows: The optimal capacity
investments in terms of number of vessels for T and C in a competitive, non-
cooperative environment are 57 trawlers and 1050 coastal vessels, respectively. The
use of these capacities results in discounted benefits of NOK 11.84 and 14.03 bilion,
respectively, to T and C, and an overall discounted economic benefit of NOK 25.85
bilion to society at large. Using only T and C vessels in the exploitation of the
resource, the optimal fleet sizes are 70 and 1100, respectively. In these cases the PV
of economic rents are NOK 32.42 and 36.11 for T and C. We also found out that, as
expected, the results obtained are rather sensitive to perturbations in fixed costs,
interest rates, initial stock size and the terminal constraint.
It is in order to state here that given that modeling and computation are always
exercises in succes sive approximation (Clark & Kirkwood, 1979), our estimates
should not be taken toa literally. Having said this, the results of the analysis indicate
that in its current state the Arcto-Norwegian cod fishery appears to suffer from over
capacity. Hence, the practical implication of this study with respect to efficient
management of the resource is that the excess capacity should be run down as rapidly
as possible to a certain level19 somewhere above the Nash equilibrium capacity level.
Thereafter the remaining excess capacity is allowed to depreciate to the "desired"
leve! by itself. From then on new capacity investment is undertaken only to make up
for depreciation. This would ensure each player his best possible outcome and the
society the second best solution.
The practical implication of the results obtained would have been somewhat different
if the fishery were under-exploited. In this case, we distinguish between staring a
completely new fishery and the case where fishing is currently in progress. In the case
of a new fishery, there is a real possibility for realising the first best solution by
allowing only C to exploit the resource with a capacity size of about 1100 coastal
19 The choice of this level wil depend on both the depreciation rate and the difference between the
co st of acquiring a new vessel and the disinvestment res ale price of the vessels relative to the price of
new vessels.
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fishery vessels. However, if political, social and cultural realities dictate the
participation of both players and this were to be in a non-cooperative environment,
then each player should aspire to start off with its Nash equilibrium capacity size as
computed herein.
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Appendix
The algorithm. The following non-standard Lagrangian function for player i follows
from our model:
(iS (r. - k iir. )+ Yo (f(B -I) - no )-1 t 1,S 1 't i ,S ,S S ,s
S
Li (n,e,y,k) =:I +y A,s(1;AnA,s-1 + E,A-inA-I,s-1 - nA,s - hA,sf
s~1 A-I
+:I Ya,t( E,a-ina-i,s-i - na,s - ha,s)-
a~1
where y := Ya,s is the player-invariant, but age and season-variant multipliers, and all
other variables are as defined earlier.
The negative superscript on some components of the equation above is a device
introduced to ensure monotone convergence of multipliers by focusing attention on
the situations where there are constraint violations. Such a device results in
multipliers that are different from those associated with the c1assical Lagrangians.
There is a relationship between the two kinds of multipliers, however, the exact
relationships are not so easy to retrieve. It is therefore necessary, at this juncture, to
call for caution when interpreting the computed equilibrium multiplier leveis.
The gradient information obtainable from Li(n,e,y), gives the adjustment equations for
the effort levels and multipliers. We first introduce a special (switch) function related
to the derivative of cp -, before we state the adjustment equations. Let the function
H (r) = 1 if r..O, and H (r) = O otherwise. If r :: O were a constraint inequality, then
H(r) wil attain a value of 1 if the constraint is violated, otherwise it attains a value of
O. In writing the adjustment equations below, this switch function is used.
Staring at arbitrar initial guesses of Ya t' na t and ei t' we pursue the dynamics given" ,
by the adjustment equations below, all the way to the equilibrium solutions.
Effort adjustment. The adjustment equation for effort given by dLi (.) is
deis
ei,s = (i~(:I V¡waq¡,ak¡na,s - ki'ß-i~s)
a
A-I
+ :IYa,sH(E,a-ina-l,s-1 - na,s - ha,J( -qi,akina,J
a~1
+ y A,sH(E,AnA,s_1 + E,A_inA_I,s_1 - nA,s - hA,sX -q¡,Ak¡nA,J
Multiplier adjustment. The equations for the sequential adjustment of the
multipliers are obtained by taking the negative of the partial differential of Li with
respect to the appropriate multiplier, that is, they come from _ dLi (. .
dYa,s
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For age group zero fish, the multiplier is adjusted according to the equation
YOs = -HCfCBs-i)-no s)CfCBs-i) -nos), , ,
Multipliers for fish of age groups between 1 and A-l are adjusted as follows
Y. - -HCt n - n - h )Ct n - n - h )a,s - '"a-l a-l,s-l aiS a,s '"a-1 a-1,s..1 a,s a,s
For the last age group, multiplier adjustment is according to
y A,s = -HC~AnA,s-1 + ~A-inA-l,S-1 - nA,s - hA,s)C~AnA,s-1 + ~A-inA-l,S-1 - nA,s - hA,.)
Here, the RHS of the equations are ca1culated and then the corresponding multipliers
adjusted according to the magnitude and direction of the ca1culated result.
Nature's adjustment of the stock leveL. Natures objective can be expressed as
LN =Yo,s(fCBs-i)-no,sf
A-l
+ L y a,J~a-ina-l,S-1 - na,s - ha,s)-
a=l
+YA,sC~AnA,S-1 +~A-inA-l,S-1 -nA,s -hA,s)-
This equation is derived from the fact that once the stock dynamics is obeyed, nature's
net benefit is O, hence, LN consist of only the constraint equations.
The updating rules for age groups, a=O, a=1,...,A-2, a=A-l, and a=A are different and
are given below separately. These are obtained by partially differentiating LNC.) with
. . dLN(.)
respect to the corresponding stock level. That is, they come from .
dnai,s
(1) The stock leve! of age zero fish is adjusted sequentially in accordance with the
equation,
. dB
no,s = Yo,s+IHCfCBJ-no,s+I)f'CBs)~
o,s
- Yo,sHCfCBs_l) - no)
+ Yl,S+IHC~onO,t - ni,s+l - hi,s+I)~O
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(2) Fish of age groups between 1 and A-2 are updated as follows,
na,s = Yo s+IHCfCBs) - nos+l)f'CB.) ~Bs
, , on a,s
+ y HCt n - n - h )C- 1 - '" q k e )a,s '-3-1 a-1,8-1 aiS a,s .. i,a i i,s
i
+ Ya+l,s+IHCçana,s - na+l,s+1 - ha+i,s+i)ça
(3) The last but one age group of fish CLe., the A-l age group) is adjusted In
accordance to the equation,
. aB
nA-I,s = Yo +IHCfCB ) - no +1 )f'CB ) s,s s ,s s an
A-I,s
+ y HCt n - n - h )C- 1 - '" q k e )A-I,s ':A-2 A-2,s-1 A-I,s A-I,s .. i,A-I i i,s
p
+ YA,s+IHCçAnA,s +ÇA-inA-I,s - nA,s+1 -hA,s+l)çA-I
C 4) Finally, the last age group, is updated using the following equation,
. , dBs
nA,s =Yo,s+IHCfCBs)- no,s+i)f CBs)-;
onA,s
+ y A,s+IHCçAnA.s + ÇA-inA-I,s - nA,s+1 - hA,s+I)ÇA
+ y A,sHCçAnA,s-1 + ÇA-inA-I,S-1 - nA,s - hA,sX - 1 - L q¡,Akiei,s)
i
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Table 2.1: No. ol Norwegian vessels operating on the 'cod lishes
group' lor live different years.
Trawlers Coastal vessls
Year
1991 57 562
1990 51 572
1988 84 661
1986 118 628
1984 12B 71 B
Table 5.0: Values ol parameters use in the madel
Weight at
spawning w(s,a)
k
0.090
0.270
0.540
0.900
1.260
1.647
2.034
2.943
3.843
5.202
7.164
8.811
1.0377
12.456
13.716
14.706
Weight in
catch w(a)
k
0.10
0.30
0,6
1.00
1.40
1.83
2.26
3.27
4.27
5.78
7.96
9.79
11.53
13.84
15.24
16.34
Selectivity
q(p,a)
=1 =2O OO OO OO O
0.0074 O
0.0074 O
0.0074 O
0.0074 0.00593
0.0074 0.00593
0.0074 0.00593
0.0074 0.00593
0.0074 0.00593
0.0074 0.00593
0.0074 0.00593
0.0074 0.00593
0.0074 0.00593
Initial
numbers
millons
167.0
135.0
108.0
88.3
71.7
58.3
46.7
38.3
30.8
0,25
20.3
16.7
13.3
10.8
8.67
7.0
Note: (1) The values lor q(p,a) are calculated using the procedure outlned in Sumaila
(1994). (2) Player Texploits lish ol age 4 and above and player C fish ol age
group 7 and above (Hannesson, 1993).
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Table 5.3: Malleable vs. Non-malleable capital. Gives the equilbrium vessel sizes and the overall discunted ecmic rentthat
acerues to society from the resource.
Vessel size (in numbers) PV of ecnomic benefit (in billio NOK)
Malleable Non-malleable Malleable Non-malleable
80th active (65 -41; 939 - 564) (57;1050) 38.26 25.87
T active (80 -49) (70) 42.35 32.42
C active /1153-761\ /1100\ 44.53 36.11
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Fig 5.1: Stock profies (in millon tonnes): llustrs the post-catch stock size in each
period for open access plus subi;idy (OAS), open access (OA), Nash equilbrium (N), T
only and C only (the optial solution).
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Fig. 5.2: Harest profies (in millon tonnes): llustrs tota harest in eah period for
open access plus subsidy (OAS), open access (OA), Nash equilbrium (NE), T only and
C only (the optima solution).
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